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THE IMPACT OF TRANSPORTATION COSTS
ON SPATIAL COMPETITION OF GRAIN BUYERS: 
AN IOWA CASE STUDY
INTRODUCTION 
The impact of a reduction in the number of lo-
cal buyers of grain has received little attention 
in the literature. More attention has been paid 
to increased concentration of grain buyers on a 
national scale. For example, when Cargill agreed 
to acquire Continental Grain in 1998, Hayenga 
and Wisner (2002) and USDA-ERS (1999) es-
timated the impact by measuring the change of 
concentration ratios nationally and regionally, 
but they did not estimate how decreased competi-
tion would affect prices or quantities. Concerns 
about a drop in local grain prices in Eastern 
Iowa arose when the city of Davenport told a 
local shipper, the River Gulf Grain Company, 
that its lease on riverfront property will not be 
renewed.  The reason for non-renewal is that 
Davenport chose to use its riverfront property 
for new urban development. 
If transportation costs are low relative to 
the market prices, then one would expect very 
little impact from reduced local competition 
because sellers would simply ship their prod-
uct to the next closest buyer at no signifi cant 
increased cost. However, transporting grain is 
costly relative to market prices. To ship 1,000 
bushels of grain an additional 10 miles would 
cost a producer between $10 and $20, or between 
1¢ and 2¢ per bushel. Because shipping grain 
is costly, the remaining local buyers in the area 
enjoy increased local market power. They can 
lower their bids marginally without losing all 
their customers because, even at the lower price, 
many of their customers would still fi nd that the 
next best alternative price net of transportation 
costs would still be lower than the now-lower 
local price.1 The extent to which the bid price can 
be lowered is limited, however. If local bid prices 
fall by too much, then local sellers will simply 
ship their grain farther away. And if one local 
buyer decides to lower price signifi cantly, then 
the remaining local grain sellers would simply 
shift their business to the other local buyer(s). 
The objective of this study is to estimate 
the impacts on local corn and soybean grain 
prices and transportation costs resulting from 
the closing of the River Gulf Grain Company. 
Currently local sellers have three main alternative 
buyers of grain: River Gulf Grain, in Davenport, 
Iowa, a buyer in Buffalo, Iowa, and a buyer in 
Clinton, Iowa. To estimate the impact of the 
closing of River Gulf the modeling approach 
fi rst developed by Hotelling (1929) is adapted. 
Hotelling’s classic model of spatial competition is adapted to estimate the impacts on grain price 
of the closure of one of three grain buyers on the Mississippi River in the vicinity of Scott County, 
Iowa. The customers of the buyer who is closing (River Gulf Grain Company) in Davenport, Iowa, 
are assumed to deliver their grain to a buyer in either Buffalo, Iowa, to the south or to a buyer 
in Clinton, Iowa, to the north. Calibration of Hotelling’s framework to this situation leads to an 
estimated decline in grain bids of 1.5¢ per bushel for the buyer located in Clinton and by 2.5¢ per 
bushel for the buyer located in Buffalo. These estimates are based on an incremental transportation 
cost of 0.15¢ per mile between the seller’s farm and the buyer. This price decline would reduce gross 
receipts of the farmers who currently deliver to Davenport by approximately $264,000 per year. The 
effect of lower price bids on gross receipts of all area farmers would be approximately $750,000 
per year. Transportation costs would increase by an estimated $75,000 for those farmers who would 
have to haul their grain farther because of the closure. 
by Miguel A. Carriquiry and Bruce A. Babcock
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The Hotelling approach is used to calculate the 
equilibrium bid price with three buyers and 
compare it to the equilibrium price with two 
buyers. The degree of price decline is limited 
by a “residual buyer” located in Muscatine, 
Iowa (south of Buffalo).2 The direct impact on 
farmers’ gross receipts of increased shipping 
costs resulting from the closing of River Gulf 
Grain is also estimated. 
Not estimated in this study are other local 
impacts that would result from the closing. 
Such impacts would include the loss of 
economic activity associated with the loss of 
19 jobs at River Gulf Grain, possible increased 
road deterioration from grain-hauling trucks, 
and increased waiting times by farmers to 
unload their grain at the remaining facilities. 
However, the adverse economic impact of the 
jobs lost at Davenport may be (at least partially) 
compensated by an increase in the number of 
jobs, or in the effi ciency in capacity utilization at 
the remaining grain buyers, who will increase the 
amount of grain handled after the closure. 
THE MODEL
The model employed to estimate the impacts 
of the closing of River Gulf Grain is an 
extension of Hotelling’s (1929) analysis of 
spatial competition. Hotelling’s line model is 
modifi ed by increasing the number of fi rms (as 
in Economides (1993)), and by reversing roles 
in the sense that buyers are the players invested 
with market power (as in Zhang and Sexton 
(2001)) to capture the economic environment 
of the problem at hand. 
Suppose that the Mississippi River can 
be approximated by a straight line, with grain 
buyers being located at different points on the 
line. There are currently four grain buyers in 
the area (Muscatine, Buffalo, Davenport, and 
Clinton) that are considered. For notational 
convenience, Muscatine, Buffalo, Davenport, 
and Clinton will be assigned numbers from 0 
to 3, respectively. Muscatine is located at D = 
0 , and Clinton is located at the other end of the 
line. Figure 1 shows a diagram of the buyers’ 
locations.
Assume that the reality of grain availability 
in two dimensions can be mapped onto the 
one-dimensional line and that there is a fi xed 
amount (normalized to one) of grain available 
in the area.3 Sellers incur transportation costs t
per unit of grain per unit of distance to market 
their production. The type of “mill pricing” 
strategy is what we observe in practice. This 
implies that the price received by sellers (net of 
transportation costs per unit of grain) decreases 
linearly with the distance from the buyer. As 
noted before, it is precisely this transportation 
cost that gives buyers their market power. It is 
also assumed that the downstream market for 
grain is perfectly competitive.4 That is, grain 
buyers cannot influence the price they receive 
when they resell grain delivered from farmers. 
Thus, each unit (bushel) of grain has a value of 
p  for all buyers. This does not mean, however, 
that all buyers will offer the same price.
Buyers choose their offer prices (p
i
, i = 
0,...,3) simultaneously and independently. Each 
buyer competes directly only with its immediate 
neighbors. Given this information, the supply 
function for each buyer with linear transportation 
costs can be derived. It is assumed hat the prices 
offered by any pair of contiguous fi rms is not 
so different (relative to transportation costs) to 
drive the supply of the low-price fi rm to zero 
or that agents use “no mill-price undercutting”5
conjectures when offering prices. This is a 
reasonable assumption, because all four fi rms 
are currently buying grain, indicating that some 
sellers are supplying them.6 It is further assumed 
that the reservation price of sellers (given by their 
next best alternative) and the costs of hauling 
Figure 1: Location of Grain Buyers on the Mississippi River in Eastern Iowa
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grain are not so high relative to the prices offered 
that some potential sellers in the market choose 
not to ship their grain to any of the buyers.7 In 
other words, it is assumed that all sellers will fi nd 
it profi table to ship the grain to a buyer.
Sellers compare the net (of transportation 
cost) prices offered by the two nearest buyers 
in order to decide who to sell to. For example, a 
seller located at point z
i,i+1
  in the interval (i,i+1, 
i =0,1,2, ) compares  p
i
 – t(z
i,i+1
– D
i
) against p
i+1
– t(D
i+1
– z
i,i+1
). By assumption there is a seller 
located in every interval (i,i+1, i = 0,1,2) 
that is indifferent between the two contiguous 
buyers. To make the seller indifferent, the 
following must be true:    
                . 
That is, the net of transport costs price 
bids of the two closest buyers must be the 
same for the indifferent seller. Solving 
the equation just presented, the indifferent 
seller in the interval (i,i+1) is located at          
             .
Intuitively, if both buyers offer the same price, 
the indifferent seller will be located in the middle 
of the interval. A buyer will attract sellers that are 
farther away by increasing its bid price relative 
to its direct rival’s bid price.
Thus, buyers located at D
0
 and D
3
 will 
receive all the grain that can be mapped to the
interval  and                respectively. 
The buyers located at the interior of the line, 
namely D = D
1
, and D = D
2
, will obtain the grain 
mapped to the interval                 and   
respectively. See Figure 2.
Since it is assumed that a fi xed amount of 
grain is available, the locations of the indifferent 
sellers determine the proportion of the output 
that each buyer will obtain. The resulting 
Figure 2: Location of Indifferent Sellers for Hypothetical Bid Prices
and Transportation Costs
(1)
(2)
(3)
for i = 0
for i = 3
for i = 1,2
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(proportional) supply functions are as follows:
where            represents the density function of 
the grain mapped onto the line with F(D
0
) = 0 
and F(D
3
) = 1.  As one would expect, the amount 
of grain a buyer can obtain increases with his/her 
bid price and the distance to the closest rival 
buyer, and decreases with their (neighboring) 
rival’s bid prices.
The distribution of corn and soybeans in 
eastern Iowa is relatively homogenous in space, 
indicating that a uniform distribution may be ad-
equate to capture the distribution of grain in the 
line. The cumulative distribution function for this 
case is F(g) = (g – D
0
)/(D
3
 – D
0
) for   
Clearly, this reality greatly simplifies the 
analysis, because closed form solutions for the 
equilibrium prices can be obtained. For situations 
in which this assumption is not valid, the analysis 
would require the use of numeric techniques. 
Also, extra care in the verifi cation that the second 
order conditions hold and that the equilibrium 
in bid prices exists is warranted. Under a 
uniform distribution, the supply equations can 
be rewritten as:
Notice that when the grain is uniformly 
distributed, the proportion of the line (and not 
the locations) covered by a buyer determines the 
amount of grain the buyer obtains. For future 
reference, note that the supply functions for 
the fi rms located within the line (equation 2’) 
indicate the area that will be covered by them in 
each direction. Notice that all buyers will obtain 
a positive grain amount only if  |p
i+1
 – p
i
| < t(D
i+1
– D
i
), i = 0,1,2.8, 9 That is, the difference in prices 
offered by two contiguous buyers is less than the 
difference in the transportations costs between 
them. Because all buyers are currently operating 
(receiving grain), attention will be restricted in 
the optimization to the continuous portions of 
the supply curves (see endnote 8). Applying a 
least-cost sharing rule, in the sense that farmers 
sell their product to the nearest buyer if more 
than one site offers the highest all-inclusive price 
(Wrede, 2003), it is easy then to verify that the 
prices derived below are an equilibrium under 
the conjectures assumed.10
(1)’
(2)’
(3)’
for i = 0
for i = 1,2
for i = 3
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Buyers’ profi ts are given by:
(4)
(5)
(6)
for i = 0,
for i = 1,2,
for i = 3.
Equations 4 through 6 indicate that a buyer’s 
total profi ts are the result of multiplying the units 
of grain the buyer is able to secure (given by 
the supply equations 1’ to 3’) by their per-unit 
profi t margin. Each buyer strives to maximize his 
own profi ts by choosing an offer price, given the 
prices offered by his rivals. First-order conditions 
for this problem are:
(7)
(8)
(9)
for i = 0,
for i = 1,2,
for i = 3
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and the second-order conditions are satisfi ed. Rearranging the system of equations given by 7 through 
9, the best response functions (on the restricted interval considered) are:
(10)
(11)
(12)
for i = 0,
for i = 1,2,
for i = 3
indicating that each buyer will choose to increase its bid price if he believes a neighboring rival will 
do the same thing.
A non-cooperative price equilibrium for this model is the set of prices    , i = 0,1,2,3 such 
that, given the price of its competitors, no seller can benefi t from unilateral price deviations. The 
equilibrium is found by solving the system of equations 7 through 9. This is a non-singular linear 
system with four equations and four unknowns (prices). It can be shown (see the Appendix) to have 
the following solutions: 
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
Equations 13 through 16 show that equilibrium bid prices depend crucially on the location of 
the fi rms (which determines the distance between them), and on the per-mile cost of transportation. 
Thus, higher per-mile transportation costs and larger distances between fi rms, both indicating reduced 
spatial competition, would lead to lower equilibrium bids.
To evaluate the change in the equilibrium price if Davenport is closed, the previous exercise 
is repeated, removing point number two from the analysis. In equilibrium, the prices offered by the 
three remaining ports are:
(17)
(18)
(19)
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AN IOWA CORN AND SOYBEAN 
APPLICATION 
Letting Muscatine be on the extreme of the line 
(D
0
 = 0), Buffalo, Davenport, and Clinton are 
located at D
1
 = 18.95, D
2
 = 29.5, and D
3
 = 70.3 
miles (according to www.mapquest.com) from 
Muscatine, respectively. 
With this information at hand, the price 
declines at the remaining three ports resulting 
from closing Davenport can be computed 
as                                            , 
and . Table 1 presents 
the predicted price changes in cents per bushel 
for corn for different per bushel per mile costs 
of transportation (t). To illustrate, the fi rst cell in 
Table 1 (Muscatine) is calculated by plugging-in 
the distances for the locations presented above 
to obtain
   cents/bushel for 
t = $0.001/bushel. The fi gure for Buffalo is 
   cents/bushel for t = 
$0.001/bushel.
The range of transportation costs in Table 
1 was obtained from two sources. Baumel, 
McVey, and Gervais (1996) estimated that 
the variable cost per mile for a farmer-owned 
truck to haul a load of 970 bushels of corn was 
$0.669, or $0.00069 per bushel. This cost esti-
mate was based on mid-1990s fuel, labor, and 
repair costs, which together account for approxi-
mately 77% of total variable costs. The price of 
fuel, as measured by the New York Mercantile 
Exchange December futures contract in 2003 
(www.barchart.com), was approximately 50% 
higher than the same futures price in 1995. Aver-
age inflation rates for labor and repair over this 
period imply a transport cost of approximately 
$0.009 for corn and $0.001 for soybeans, which 
is the lower end of the estimates in Table 1. Using 
a different method, Trimac Consulting Services 
(1999) estimated for Transport Canada that the 
variable cost per mile of hauling grain varied 
from $0.0016 to $0.0019 per bushel when con-
verted into U.S. dollars using an exchange rate 
of Canadian $0.75 to U.S. $1.00. This serves as 
the upper range of the transport cost.
As expected, the price impact of closing a 
buying facility is sensitive to transportation costs. 
Over this range, a doubling of transportation 
costs doubles the decline in bids. It is diffi cult to 
obtain a precise estimate of transportation costs 
because it varies so widely among producers. 
The estimates used in Table 1 are based on the 
assumption that grain is hauled only one way, so 
if a farmer needs to travel an extra 10 miles to 
deliver grain, the actual distance traveled is 20 
miles. These costs do not account for the cost of 
any additional waiting times to unload.
Table 1 shows that the price drop will be 
larger in Buffalo than in the other two ports. Dav-
enport is about 10 miles from Buffalo, and about 
40 miles from Clinton. The competition between 
Davenport and Buffalo therefore is expected to 
be more intense than competition between 
Davenport and Clinton. In the model presented 
here, Muscatine does not feel the pressure of 
Davenport’s competition directly. Its adjustment 
is predicted to be milder than that of the direct 
competitors. The predicted price declines vary 
directly with transportation costs. If incremental 
shipping costs are 0.15¢ per bushel per mile, then 
price bids are estimated to decline by 1.2¢ in 
Muscatine, by 2.5¢ in Buffalo, and by 1.5¢ per 
bushel in Clinton (column 2 of Table 1).
After obtaining the equilibrium bid prices, 
the proportions of the line being covered by each 
buyer can be obtained from the supply equations 
Table 1. Predicted Change in Bid Prices (Cents per Bushel) for Alternative Transportation 
Costs after Davenport Closure 
t = $0.001 t = $0.0015 t = $0.002
Muscatine -0.8 -1.2 -1.7
Buffalo -1.7 -2.5 -3.3
Clinton -1.0 -1.5 -2.0
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1’ through 3’. The results of the model indicate 
that Davenport is currently covering 25.8 
miles (or 36.7%) of the line (see Table 2). 
This fi gure results from plugging equations 14 
through 16 in equation 2’ for i = 2 to obtain
(which represents 25.8 of the 70.3 miles long 
line). In 2002 Davenport purchased about 12 
million bushels of corn and 4.1 million bushels 
of soybeans. This would indicate that if the grain 
is uniformly distributed over the line as assumed 
in the model, then the density of corn is roughly 
462,000 bushels per mile, and that about 158,000 
bushels of soybeans can be mapped to a mile of 
the line. According to the model, upon the exit 
of Davenport, Buffalo and Clinton will share the 
“space” left open. Buffalo will capture 80.7% of 
Davenport’s area of influence, whereas Clinton 
will capture 19.3%. These percents are obtained 
by comparing the lengths of the line covered by 
Buffalo and Clinton in Davenport’s direction 
before and after the closure. For Buffalo , the 
second term of equation 2’,   , 
gives the proportion of the line covered by 
this buyer in the direction of Davenport for 
any pair of bid prices p
1
 and p
2
 before the 
proposed closure. Multiplying the previous 
expression by (D
3
 – D
0
), which converts the 
proportions of the line to actual miles, and 
plugging-in the equilibrium bid prices,   and 
    (equations 14 and 15), Buffalo covered
miles in Davenport’s direction. After the closure, 
Clinton becomes Buffalo’s closest buyer in 
Davenport’s direction. Modifying the second 
term of equation 2’ accordingly, by substituting 
Clinton’s bid by Davenport’s bid, and plugging-in 
the equilibrium price bids after the closure (given 
in equations 18 and 19), the length of the line 
covered by Buffalo in Davenport’s direction (after 
converting proportions into miles) is given by 
miles.  Therefore, the model predicts that 
Buffalo will capture 29.73-8.92=20.81 miles 
or 80.7% of the 25.8 miles initially covered by 
Davenport. The difference between the numbers 
just presented and those in Table 2 for Buffalo 
account for the length of the line covered by 
this buyer in the direction of Muscatine before 
and after the closure of Davenport. The reader 
can verify this by plugging the equilibrium bid 
prices in the fi rst term of equation 2’ for i=1. A 
similar calculation (using equation 3’) indicates 
that Clinton covered 16.65 miles and 21.63 miles 
before and after Davenport’s closure respectively 
(see Table 2), which amount to an increase of 
21.63-16.65=4.98 miles or 19.3% of the 25.8 
miles initially covered by Davenport. 
Despite the fact that the model predicts 
that Buffalo would lower its price more than 
would Clinton, it will increase the area covered 
by a larger amount than would Clinton. This is 
again attributable to the geographical location 
of Davenport, which is relatively close to Buf-
falo. These increases in areas are represented by 
increases in the length of the line covered and 
are shown in Table 2. 
Table 2. Length of the Line Covered by Each Buyer
With River Gulf Grain Without River Gulf Grain
Length 
covered (miles)
Proportion of 
Supply
Length 
covered 
(miles)
Proportion of
Supply
Muscatine 9.4 13.3% 13.5 19.2%
Buffalo 18.5 26.3% 35.2 50.0%
Davenport 25.8 36.7% - -
Clinton 16.6 23.7% 21.6 30.8%
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The fi nancial impact for the area initially 
covered by Davenport is obtained by comparing 
the price paid by Davenport multiplied by its 
quantity purchased and the prices that the 
same amount of grain would receive after the 
Davenport closing in Buffalo and Clinton, 
weighted by the amounts absorbed by each of 
them. Let          be the gross receipts obtained by 
the current sellers who deliver to Davenport. If 
Davenport is closed,    will be shared between 
Buffalo (80.7%) and Clinton (19.3%). This 
implies that the gross receipts for the current 
Davenport sellers after River Gulf closes are 
      , where    and    are the
equilibrium bid prices submitted by Buffalo 
and Clinton respectively after the closure of 
Davenport. The direct fi nancial impact of closing 
Davenport is the difference between those two 
quantities, or
dollars.11 The price change for this region is thus 
–10.93t dollars per bushel. For t = $0.001/bushel, 
this change represents a 10.93*0.001*100 = 
1.093  cents per bushel decline (see Table 3). The 
estimates of the change in total receipts for the 12 
million bushels of corn and 4.1 million bushels 
of soybeans delivered to Davenport in 2002 are 
reported in Table 3. To illustrate, the changes in 
gross receipts for corn and soybeans in this region 
when t = $0.001/bushel are –1.093*12,000,000/
100 = –$131,160, and  –1.093*4,100,000/100 = 
–$44,813 respectively.  
The direct fi nancial impact for the region 
as a whole can be estimated by comparing total 
gross receipts for the region before and after 
the change. Differences in gross receipts are 
calculated by multiplying the predicted change 
in bid price (weighted average) by the total 
supply. This last quantity is inferred from the 
amount of corn and soybeans currently being 
shipped to Davenport (more on this below). The 
predicted average change in bid prices is  –11.38t 
dollars per bushel (details of this calculation are 
presented in the Appendix), or  –1.138 cents per 
bushel for t = $0.001/bushel. Table 4 presents 
the results. 
Without more detailed data about current 
grain deliveries to Clinton and Buffalo, a more 
precise estimate cannot be made. However, 
note that the Table 4 estimates assume that 32.7 
million bushels of corn and 11.2 million bushels 
of soybeans are affected by the lower bids. 
According to the National Agricultural Statistics 
Service of the United States Department of 
Agriculture’s website (www.usda.gov/nass), 
Scott County alone produced an average of 18 
million bushels of corn and 4.2 million bushels 
Table 3: Predicted Change in Price and Total Receipts for Sellers of Corn and Soybeans 
That Currently Deliver to Davenport
t = $0.001 t = $0.0015 t = $0.002
Difference in gross 
receipts (cents per 
bushel) -1.093 -1.639 -2.185
Difference in gross 
receipts for corn -$131,160 -$196,680 -$262,200
Difference in gross 
receipts for soy-
beans
-$44,813 -$67,199 -$87,585
Total difference -$175,973 -$263,879 -$349,785
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Table 4: Predicted Change in Price and Gross Receipts for Corn and Soybean Sellers
in the Area Under Study
t = $0.001 t = $0.0015 t = $0.002
Difference in gross 
receipts (cents per 
bushel) -1.138 -1.707 -2.276
Difference in gross 
receipts for corn -$372,126 -$558,189 -$744,252
Difference in gross 
receipts for 
soybeans
-$127,456 -$191,184 -$254,912
Total difference -$499,582 -$749,373 -$999,164
of soybeans from 2000 to 2002. Thus, the Table 
4 estimates seem reasonable because the area 
affected by lower bid prices consists of more than 
just Scott County. Clinton is located in Clinton 
County, which produced 29.9 million bushels of 
corn and 6.3 million bushels of soybeans in 2002; 
and Muscatine is located in Muscatine County, 
which produced 14.7 million bushels of corn and 
3.6 million bushels of soybeans in 2002. 
It might seem that the amount of production 
that would receive a lower price is being 
underestimated because the actual amount of 
grain produced in the region is much larger than 
that delivered to the three buyers. However, the 
number of affected bushels must be related to 
the aggregate amount of grain being delivered 
to Davenport. In 2002, 12 million bushels 
of corn were delivered to Davenport, which 
covered 25.8 miles, or 36.7% of the line. The 
model then predicts (by the assumption that 
grains are uniformly distributed along the 
line) that 32.7 million bushels of corn and 11.2 
million bushels of soybeans will receive a lower 
price, which is 2.73 bushels affected for each 
bushel that was delivered to Davenport. As an 
example, the difference in gross receipts for 
corn in the area studied for t = $0.001/bushel is 
–11.38*t*32,700,000 = –$372,126. 
Strictly speaking, the change in gross receipts 
presented in Table 4 is not a welfare loss to the 
community, but a wealth transfer from the sellers 
to the buyers. In other words, the difference in 
gross receipts presented in Table 4 equals the 
increase in buyers’ profi ts.12 However, after the 
closure of Davenport, farmers in its proximity 
will have to haul their grain farther. This entails 
higher costs for the farmer not captured by the 
change in gross receipts presented in Table 4. 
Of course, a portion of these costs will also 
benefi t other sectors (e.g. gas stations and repair 
services) in the local economy. The next task is 
to estimate the direct increase in transportation 
costs that will be incurred by the current sellers 
to Davenport because of increased hauling 
distances.
INCREASED TRANSPORTATION 
COSTS
To estimate the effect of closing the Davenport 
buyer on the change in total transportation costs 
that must be incurred to transport grain to the 
neighboring buyers in Buffalo and Clinton, data 
on the geographical location and concentration of 
Davenport’s current suppliers was used. That data 
was provided by the River Gulf Grain Company. 
The increased transportation costs are estimated 
by multiplying the average change in hauling 
distance by the number of bushels delivered by 
the cost per bushel per unit of distance. 
The change in distance is estimated by 
assuming that each customer ships grain from 
the geographic center of that customer’s zip 
code region. Then the distance to each potential 
buying point was calculated by entering the 
zip code and the address of all the potential 
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shipping locations (using mapquest.com). For 
simplicity, it is further assumed that each of 
River Gulf’s customers in 2002 would choose 
to ship to the closest alternative buying point, 
hence an estimate of the extra number of miles 
each customer will need to haul its grain is 
obtained. 
The available data indicate that 3,323 
customers delivered grain to River Gulf Grain 
in 2002. Assuming that quantities of corn and 
soybeans currently delivered to Davenport are 
distributed uniformly among these customers, 
each customer is assumed to deliver 3,611 
(12,000,000/3,323) bushels of corn and 
1,234 (4,100,000/3,323) bushels of soybeans. 
Multiplying the amount of each product (corn 
or soybeans) that each customer delivers by the 
extra number of miles that customer needs to 
drive, and by the per-mile-bushel transportation 
rate an estimate for the additional transportation 
cost for that customer is obtained. Summing over 
all of Davenport customers yield the numbers 
presented in Table 5. To illustrate the calculations 
performed, the total number of extra miles that 
need to be driven after the closure of Davenport 
is 2,078.7. This fi gure was obtained through the 
procedure outlined in the previous paragraph. 
Using the assumption that the quantities of 
corn and soybeans are distributed uniformly 
among sellers, the additional transportation 
costs for the customers delivering to Davenport 
are 2,078.7*3,611*0.001 =$7,506 and 2,078.7
*1,234*0.001=$2,565 for corn and soybeans 
respectively and t = $0.001/bushel.13   
The reason why these transport cost 
estimates are small is that this method of 
calculating the change in distance results in a 
reduction in shipping costs for 61% of River 
Gulf’s customers. That is, Davenport is farther 
away for these customers than is the next closest 
buyer. These customers must have had some 
other reason for shipping grain to River Gulf 
than simply shipping distance. 
Table 6 reports the increased shipping costs 
for only the 39% of customers that would have 
an increased distance to ship their grain. The 
procedure to obtain the fi gures in Table 6 is the 
same as for Table 5, but summing only over 
the customers that would have an increased 
distance to ship their grain. The increased 
distance for these customers is 10,344 miles, 
implying an increase in transportation costs 
of 10,344*3,611*0.001= $37,352 and 10,344
*1,234*0.001=$12,765 for corn and soybeans 
respectively and t = $0.001/bushel. Subtracting 
the Table 6 estimates from Table 5 estimates 
shows the savings in shipping costs that would 
occur for those customers who reside closer to 
Clinton or Buffalo than to Davenport. The fact 
that many customers chose to ship their grain to 
Davenport even though one of the other buyers 
was closer indicates that River Gulf Grain must 
have offered some other benefi t that overcame 
the increased travel costs. Two likely reasons 
are a stronger bid (which is consistent with the 
predictions of the model presented (see endnote 
11) or a shorter waiting time to unload grain. The 
estimates made in this study do not account for 
Table 5: Additional Transportation Costs for the Customers Trading With Davenport
t = $0.001 t = $0.0015 t = $0.002
Increased transport costs
 for corn $7,506 $11,259 $15,012
Increased transport costs
for soybeans
$2,565 $3,848 $5,130
Total additional
transportation costs
$10,071 $15,107 $20,142
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Table 6: Additional Transportation Costs for Customers That Would Incur an Increase in 
Shipping Costs
t = $0.001 t = $0.0015 t = $0.002
Increased transport costs 
for corn $37,352 $56,028 $74,704 
Increased transport costs 
for soybeans
$12,765 $19,147 $25,529
Total additional 
transportation costs
$50,117 $75,175 $100,233
the latter “hidden” benefi t that would be affected 
if River Gulf Grain were to close.
CONCLUSIONS
Few estimates exist on the impact of local market 
power on buyers’ bids for grain.  The potential 
closing of River Gulf Grain in Davenport, Iowa, 
provides an opportunity to apply existing spatial 
models to the problem of estimating the impacts 
of reducing the number of grain buyers in a lo-
cal market from three to two. Hotelling’s line 
model of spatial competition was calibrated to 
model the impact of a decrease in grain-buying 
competition on the Mississippi River. The key 
parameter in the model is the incremental cost 
of hauling grain. Estimates of this cost range 
between 0.1¢ to 0.2¢ per bushel per mile. Bids 
for grain by the remaining buyers in the local 
region are estimated to drop by between 0.8¢ and 
3.3¢ per bushel given this range of transportation 
costs. This price decrease results in a decrease in 
gross revenue from grain of between $499,582 
and $999,164 per year. Additional costs from 
the departure of River Gulf Grain include ad-
ditional transportation costs of between $50,117 
and $100,233 for those sellers who fi nd that they 
will have to haul their grain a greater distance.
Endnotes
1. If one buyer lowers his or her bid by a small amount, only those sellers who were indifferent 
between selling to the one buyer or another buyer will change their decision about where to deliver 
their grain. This means that each buyer faces an upward sloping grain supply function.
2. It is implicitly assumed that illegal collusion between buyers does not occur.
3. This is just for notational convenience. Later, the current density for corn and soybeans will be 
used.
4. Zhang and Sexton (2001) argue that due to the high costs of transporting bulky and/or perishable 
products and a lower substitutability in consumers’ budgets, markets for farm products are likely to 
be narrower (in both products and geographic dimensions) than those of fi nished food products. 
5. The term “no mill-price undercutting” is usually used in spatial models where sellers have market 
power (e.g. Novshek, 1980). Under these conjectures a fi rm takes the price of the other fi rms as 
given, but assumes that they will match any price cut that would drive them out of business (Martin, 
2002). Applying the concept to the model presented, it is assumed that fi rms take the price of their 
rivals as given, but expect other fi rms to match any price that is high enough as to leave them with 
no supplies.
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6. This condition also has to be satisfi ed in equilibrium. A fi rm facing no supply makes zero profi ts 
and hence has an incentive to increase its offer price. (See Tirole 1988). “No mill-price undercut-
ting” conjectures have been defended on the grounds that they are the minimal departure from Nash 
conjectures (taking the actions of the other participants as given) that permit the existence of pure 
strategy equilibrium in prices and location in the basic Hotelling model (Novshek, 1980, Martin, 
2002). Simply put, a pure strategy Nash equilibrium for the problem at hand is a vector of bid prices 
such that no individual buyer can increase his profi ts by unilaterally changing his bid. 
7. For a discussion of models in which this does not hold, see Martin 2002, and the references 
therein. 
8. When transportation costs are linear, the model is not well-behaved, in the sense that the supply 
functions are not continuous, and existence of equilibrium under standard Nash conjectures is not 
assured (e.g., Tirole 1988, or Martin 2002). In fact, for the distance between the cities considered it 
can be shown that a pure strategy equilibrium does not exist for Nash conjectures. 
9. With only two fi rms, this condition must be satisfi ed in equilibrium (D’Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and 
Thisse, 1979). This also rules out the possibility of spatial arbitrage between the buying points.
10. For the two-fi rms case, D’Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse (1979) provide necessary and 
suffi cient conditions for the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in prices. In the problem 
at hand, the fact that all the buyers under consideration face a positive supply lends support to the 
conjectures selected. 
11. To see this, note that plugging-in the distances for the locations presented, equations 15, 18 and 
19 indicate that   ,        , and     . Replacing these equilibrium bid prices in 
the previous equation yields
12. This point was raised by an anonymous referee and is gratefully acknowledged.
13. If this assumption does not hold, the formula is   , where d
j 
denotes the extra number 
of miles that customer j would need to drive after the closure of Davenport and q
j
 is the amount of 
corn or soybean owned by customer j.
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APPENDIX
Solving for the Equilibrium Price Bids When there are Four Firms Bidding
The system of equations 7 -9  can be written (after multiplying each equation by 2t(D3 – D0)) in 
matrix form as
or A*P = B. Since the matrix A is nonsingular it can be inverted to yield  P* = A-1B which equals
Equations 13 through 16 are obtained by carrying out the matrix multiplication just presented. 
Predicted Change in Bid Prices for the Region
The average bid price change for the region is calculated as the difference in weighted average 
prices with and without the buyer in Davenport (River Gulf Grain). The weights are given by the 
proportion of the line covered by each buyer. Mathematically, the average equilibrium price for 
the region when River Gulf Grain is present is (making use of D
0
 = 0) given by:
  
                                                                                                               ,
which can be simplifi ed to                                                                               .   
Similarly, the average equilibrium price without River Gulf Grain (or buyer number two in the 
current setting) is                          , or
                                                               .
Here,                  represent the number of miles to the right of fi rm i = 0,1,2 (i = 0,1) covered by 
that buyer when River Gulf Grain is (is not) present. Therefore the average price change can be 
computed as the difference between these two quantities    or
dollars per bushel.
Note that every expression within each interior bracket is a difference between two offer prices. Since 
those prices are linear in  p (the net of processing and/or handling costs buyer’s valuation for the 
product) the change in price for the region can be computed with the information available.
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